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WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
advocating for an approach to statutory interpretation very much (but not
exactly) like the one he describes in his book. In this Article, I argue that
the textualist approach has not been successful, and has begun losing
influence with the other members of the Court. The crux of my argument
is that Scalia writes convincingly, both in his book and in his opinions,
about why one would want to approach interpretation with such deference
to the text. But because the textualist approach is based on an
insufficiently sophisticated understanding of the human language faculty,
it fails, regardless of how much 'one may agree with the considerations
that motivate it.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a Wittgensteinian parlor game, in which a participant begins
by uttering a sentence that contains only commonly used words. Another
player then must create the most bizarre story she can that is loyal to the
language in the first player's sentence. When each person, has had a
chance to make up a story, the player who told the most imaginative one
wins.
The trick is to imagine real, but unconventional uses of the words in
the sentence. For example, if the sentence is, "Bill threw the ball over
the tree," a winning story might be one in which "throw" means
"corruptly cause the loss of a competitive event," as in, "the quarterback,
who had accepted a bribe from organized crime, threw the game."
"Ball" might mean a formal dance. "Over" is interpreted
nonprototypically to mean "about" rather than "above." The story might
involve some kind of inter-family competition among high society
members over which family organizes the best ball. One member of one
of the families, Bill, was angry over his sibling's unilateral decision to
have his favorite tree cut down, and he decided to get his revenge by
undermining the family's chances of winning the competition. Perhaps
the reader can come up with an even wilder response.
What makes the game fun is that it forces us to suspend whatever
conventional notions we have about how words are likely to be used. In
understanding language, we ordinarily take advantage of contextual cues
and of knowledge of how words are used prototypically.2 The game, in
contrast, requires us to take all words out of context, to ignore our
knowledge of the prototypical uses of words, and to create arbitrary new
contexts. Thus, the game depends on the notion that we ordinarily use
context and our knowledge of prototypical instances of a concept when we
2. The importance of prototypes in the formation and interpretation of concepts
is discussed in detail infra part V.
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understand language. Otherwise, there would be nothing different
between the game on the one hand, and ordinary language understanding
on the other.
. For the past ten years, the Supreme Court has been interpreting
statutes according to a set of rules that very much resemble the rules of
this parlor game. Developed largely by Justice Scalia, the methodology,
which has been called the "new textualism,"' intentionally eschews many
of the contextual and cognitive cues that make language meaningful. Of
course, the Court's textualism is not exactly like our parlor game. But
the similarities are clear enough. Instead of insisting that the interpreter
assume no context whatsoever, as does the parlor game, the Court has
selected a few categories of contextual information as the only ones that
the interpreter may consider. These include the language of related
provisions of the statute being examined, and perhaps more remote
sections of the United States Code, in the case of federal statutes.4 They
also include the prior interpretive decisions of the Court. To the extent
that other information, such as legislative history, is allowed into the
picture at all (a move that Justice Scalia rejects but others accept), its role
is limited to potentially disconfirming the plain language analysis in
especially egregious cases.5 As in our game, the Court has rejected
reliance on prototypical understandings of words, and has substituted the
outer bounds of dictionary definitions for our everyday knowledge of how
words are ordinarily used. Perhaps most significantly, neither the game
nor the Court permits prior consideration of the broader ramifications of
the proffered interpretation.
In this Article, I will show that this methodology flies in the face of
the most basic strategies that we have for understanding natural language.
Advances in linguistics and cognitive psychology have demonstrated that
we simply do not understand language that way. Rather, we use
contextual information and knowledge of prototypes in everyday speech
and understanding, and we use this information automatically and
unselfconsciously. In short, textualism does not work very well as a
theory of interpretation if, by "interpretation," we mean getting to the
3. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621
(1990); see also Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal
Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597 (1991); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The
Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States
Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277 (1990).
4. For a typical example, see West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499
U.S. 83 (1991); see also discussion infra part II.
5. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993); see also discussion
infra part IV.B.
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meaning that the speaker, in this case Congress, intended the text to
convey.6
I argue that this brand of textualism is best seen as an experiment in
which the Court has tacitly posited an idealized theory of cognition in
statutory cases in order to enhance the rule of law.7 The hypothesis of
the experiment is that we can meaningfully understand the language of
statutes by looking only at the limited materials that the theory makes
available to us. Scalia calls this a search for "objectified intent." For
the hypothesis to be confirmed, we need not actually use the textualist
methodology to understand language in everyday life. Rather, the
experiment will succeed if this reduced reliance on extra-textual
information sufficiently emulates the results of ordinary language
understanding so that it acts as a reasonable surrogate for our routine
cognitive strategies. To the extent that we are successfully able to keep
the materials relied upon to a clearly defined set, we eliminate whatever
variability further exploration would necessarily entail.
To test this hypothesis, one would want to apply it in disputes over
the meaning of various statutes over time. If the method results in
argumentation that the Court itself soon feels obliged to abandon in future
cases on the same subject matter, or in precedents that Congress routinely
overrides, or that are clearly at odds with the contextual information that
the method has instructed the Court to ignore, then the hypothesis will be
.disconfirmed.
6. In his opinions, Scalia appears to agree with this goal, but argues that the best
evidence of intent is the language that the legislature actually used. See INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992) (opinion of Scalia, J.) ("In construing statutes, 'we
must, of course, start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the
ordinary meaning of the words used."') (quoting Richards v. United States, 396 U.S. 1,
9 (1962)); Morales v. TWA, 504 U.S. 374, 382 (1992) (opinion of Scalia, J.) ("The
question, at bottom, is one of statutory intent, and we acc6rdingly 'begin with the
language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that
language accurately expresses the legislative purposes.'") (quoting FMC Corp. v.
Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57 (1990)); United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 452 (1988)
(holding that statutory scheme is appropriate method to gauge "congressional intent.").
I do not mean to imply that the interpretive process ends with that analysis, but I do agree
that it should begin there. For some important works that discuss the need to reevaluate
the meanings of statutes in light of contextual changes over time, see GUIDO CALABRFESI,
A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating
Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in
Translation, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1165 (1993).
7. Ironically, Scalia considers reference to legislative history by judges to be a
"failed experiment." A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 36.
8. A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 17.
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A successful experiment would bring substantial rewards. It would
confirm that we really can elect a legislature to make rules by which we
can govern ourselves, and that the rules really work. However, if the
experiment were to fail, the result would be to have created a judicial
system that has not done its duty to make its decisions based on its most
considered wisdom, opting instead to make superficial decisions based on
only a fraction of the information about which any serious person making
important determinations would care. Let us not forget that the
experiment is being performed on live subjects.
By these criteria, the decade-long experiment has not been a success.
Congress has been especially quick to override significant textualist
decisions,9 and the Court has offered interpretations that are almost
certainly at odds with the intent of the enacting Congress.' 0 Most
significantly, the Court has come to recognize the deficiencies of
textualism, leading it to reverse field on several doctrinal fronts." This
recognition has led the various Justices in two directions. First, Justice
Scalia himself has attempted to expand his notion of meaning to include
information about prototypical understandings of words. This was
missing from his early opinions that relied so heavily on the dictionary. 2
I argue that this is a giant step in the right direction, but cannot save the
textualist enterprise since failure to recognize prototype information is
only part of the problem. Using a different strategy, some of the other
Justices are retreating from textualism, bringing context back into the
analysis, and evaluating their interpretations by looking at the doctrinal
consequences of their rulings. Both strategies show the Court's
recognition that the parlor game is ending, and it is time to move on. La
commedia ? finita.3
9. See, e.g., West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991). But see
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 113(b), 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995)) (effectively overruling Casey); see also infra
note 42 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990) (construing a
statutory ban against the interstate transportation of "falsely made" securities to mean a
ban on documents containing false information). In a convincing dissent, Justice Scalia
points out that "falsely made" meant forged or altered at the time of the statute's
enactment. Id. at 123-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's dissent in this case
should serve as an appropriate illustration of the fact that it is not Scalia himself that is
the subject of this Article, but rather a methodology that he largely developed.
11. See infra part V. For example, in Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501
(1995), the Supreme Court adopted an analysis for what it means to "use a firearm" in
a drug trafficking crime that differed substantially from the analysis the Court used just
two years earlier in Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
12. See, e.g., Smith, 508 U.S. at 241-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13. RuoiFRo LEONCAVALLO, PAOLIACCI, Act 11 (1892).
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In Part I of this Article, I lay out the problem by focusing on
the Supreme Court's 1985 decision in United States v. Locke.14 Locke,
a case involving the Court's strict adherence to a deadline in an
unambiguous, but trickily worded statute, has been widely criticized by
scholars. I offer a reevaluation of Locke as an exercise in practical
wisdom that brings to light the tension between the strict adherence to
rules and the desire to do justice in the individual case. In Part II, I
describe Justice Scalia's textualism more fully through an illustrative case,
West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey. 5 In Part III, I
criticize textualism as being at odds with the way that we go about
understanding language. I show that even under the hypothesis that
textualism should be seen as the use of a set of idealized assumptions, it
does not provide the level of understanding required to meet the goal of
interpreting statutes to fulfil the wishes of the enacting legislature. The
criticism makes use of a number of insights developed by linguists,
psychologists and philosophers over the past few decades. Part IV
describes a modified textualism that the Court frequently adopts, in which
legislative history is considered, but only marginally. I argue that this is
an improvement, but still inadequate if we wish to achieve a level of
understanding of statutory language that at least matches our
understanding of speech in everyday life. In Part V, I discuss recent
cases in which the Supreme Court has broken away from the textualist
model. I focus on the two distinct trends discussed above: Scalia's
reliance on a more sophisticated notion of word meaning that allows for
much more complete analysis of statutory language even within the
textualist framework; and the Court's (sometimes surreptitious) rejection
of the textualist approach altogether. I conclude that the recent trends are
generally healthy ones that are far more in keeping with our cognitive
strategies for interpreting language, and therefore more likely to lead to
a coherent and thoughtful jurisprudence of statutory interpretation.
I. LocKE REVISITED
In 1985, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Locke. In an
opinion by Justice Marshall, the Court held that a deadline is a deadline.
Section 314 of the then recently-enacted Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 states that a notice of intention to hold one's
unpatented mining claim must be filed with the Bureau of Land
14. 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
15. 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
240
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Management (BLM) "prior to December 31 of each year." 16  Locke
filed his notice on December 31, 1980. He therefore suffered the
statute's sanction for a late filing: a conclusive presumption that the mine
has been abandoned.' 7  Locke and his family had been operating the
mine since the 1960s. 8 The Supreme Court's refusal to grant a one-day
reprieve seemed to mean that they were to lose their family business.
Ironically, the BLM had made the same mistake in its 1978 question
and answer brochure, in which it advised miners that the annual filing
must be made on or before December 31."' Moreover, at Locke's
request, Locke's daughter called the local BLM office and was told that
the filing had to be made "on or before December 31, 1980." ' Locke
complied with this advice.
Locke has been widely criticized for its "wooden" adherence to
language that "create[s] a trap for valuable property rights."2' But a
footnote in the majority opinion," and Justice O'Connor's
concurrence,' hint otherwise. The decision may be much more directed
toward fairness to the Locke family than initially appears. Justice Stevens
argued in dissent that the phone call of Locke's daughter to the BLM
should play a crucial role in the case's outcome.24 In footnote 7, Justice
Marshall, responding to this argument, suggests that it might have been
appropriate for the district court to have applied the doctrine of equitable
estoppel against the government for its poor advice about the deadline.'
16. 43 U.S.C. § 1744(a) (1994). The statute reads in relevant part: "The owner
of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim located prior to [the date of this Act] shall,
within the three-year period following [the date of this Act] and prior to December 31 of
each year thereafter, file the instruments required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this
subsection." § 1744(a).
17. See 43 U.S.C. § 1744(c).
18. Locke, 471 U.S. at 127 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 90 n.7. By the time that Locke made his one-day error, the BLM had
corrected its brochure. Id.
20. Id. at 89, 90 n.7.
21. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 267-68 (1990); see
William D. Popkin, Law-Making Responsibility and Statutory Interpretation, 68 IND. L.J.
865, 876-77 (1993); Zeppos, supra note 3, at 1614-18.
22. Locke, 471 U.S. at 90 n.7.
23. Id. at 110-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25. Although equitable estoppel is rarely applied against the government, the
Court had only recently decided Heckler v. Community Health Servs. of Cranford
County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51 (1984), in which it denied estoppel, but commented: "[W]e are
hesitant ... to say that there are no cases in which the public interest in ensuring that the
Government can enforce the law free from estoppel might be outweighed by the
countervailing interest of citizens in some minimum standard of decency, honor, and
reliability in their dealings with their Government." Id. at 60. Justice Marshall's threat
1997:235
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Since the district court had not considered this estoppel claim, the Court
remanded the case for further consideration. Justice O'Connor's
concurrence was based entirely on the possibility of equitable estoppel.'
Interestingly, Locke was never actually decided on remand. Having read
footnote 7, the government decided to abandon the case, and the Lockes
got back their mine. 7
Of course, the Court could have maintained the sanctity of deadlines
by holding that Congress had made a drafting error, and that December
31 will be the absolute filing deadline each year. This possibility is what
prompted the sharp criticism by Judge Posner and others.' Regardless,
the majority opinion does provide an elegant combination of respect for
the plain rule of law on the one hand, and compassion for the individual
on the other. The opinion is about the strict adherence to deadlines, but
the result is about the obligation of government agencies to treat the
citizenry fairly.
The happy outcome for the Locke family was the result of a
combination of fortuitous circumstances and some skillful judging.
Marshall reached an accommodation between respect for legislative action
and fairness to the parties without resorting to the common law judging
that Scalia complains so forcefully is inappropriate in statutory cases.'
But the availability of a solution to Locke based on practical wisdom
obscures the difficult question that at other times cannot be avoided: Can
we have a satisfactory theory of statutory interpretation that attempts to
rely on a literal reading of statutes, and little else? Posner's reaction to
Locke, notwithstanding that the facts were not as they seemed, suggests
that the answer is no. We cannot always construe statutes in a manner
that will both preserve a strong rule of law and resolve disputes in a way
that fulfills some reasonable sense of the purpose behind the law's original
enactment.' By looking closely at the textualist experiment, and
comparing its hypotheses and assumptions to the ways in which we
actually comprehend language, we can see why this is so.
was, no doubt, that the Locke case may be just such an instance.
26. Locke, 471 U.S. at 111-12.
27. Telephone interview with Harold Swafford, Esq. (Aug. 1996). Mr. Swafford
represented the Locke family.
28. See, POSNER, supra note 21, at 267-69.
29. A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 10-11.
30. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT
(1996).
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II. THE TEXTUALIST EXPERIMENT
One year after Locke was decided, Justice Scalia was appointed to the
Court. Scalia's approach relies heavily on detailed analysis of statutory
language and rejects extra-textual considerations. While not all justices
have accepted his approach, without question it has been an enormous
influence on the Court. Even those opinions that are based on
considerations other than plain language now routinely go through
painfully detailed grammatical analysis."
Scalia's textualism rejects reliance on extra-statutory phenomena,
such as the legislative history of the statute's enactment, subsequent
legislative history, and efforts to ascertain the mischief that the statute
seeks to address.32 Underlying this textualist approach is a confidence
that at the very least, a substantial part of the meaning of a statute is
ordinarily ascertainable from a close reading of the statutory language,33
and from "commonsensical" inferences deriving from the canons of
construction. 4  The further a court ventures from the statute itself,
therefore, the less respect the court is affording the legislative will, and
the more the court is finding a way to impose its own wishes on the
population. Conversely, the more we allow rules to speak for themselves,
the stronger the rule of law.35
31. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177-79, 184-86 (1993),
discussed infra part IV.B.
32. Wisconsin Pub. lntervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 617 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment) (stating that Committee Reports are unreliable "not only as a
genuine indicator of congressional intent but as a safe predictor of judicial construction
... [the Court] use[s] them when it is convenient, and ignorels] them when it is not");
Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 632 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (stating
that "[alrguments based on subsequent legislative history .. . should not be taken
seriously"); Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 131 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for adopting a rule that "[wihere a term of art has a plain
meaning, the Court will divine the statute's purpose and substitute a meaning more
appropriate to that purpose").
33. Cf. Antonin Scalia, Originalisn: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849,
856 (1989) (arguing that words have "meaning enough, as the scholarly critics themselves
must surely believe when they choose to express their views in text rather than music").
34. A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 25-26. Referring to certain
canons, Scalia writes: "All of this is so commonsensical that, were the canons not couched
in Latin, you would find it hard to believe anyone could criticize them. But in fact, the
canons have been attacked as a sham." Id. at 26.
35. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175 (1989).
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Among Scalia's greatest concerns is the use of legislative history in
the judicial process.' Even scholars with diverse ideological
orientations have agreed that inquiry into the collective "will" of hundreds
of senators and representatives who did not necessarily even speak with
one another during the legislative process is not a coherent enterprise.37
Moreover, to the extent that legislators, and even staff members, are
aware that their pre-enactment statements will be used by courts in
subsequent interpretation, there is room-and even motive-for abuse. 8
36. A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 16-18, 29-37; see also
United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 521 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment) (referring to legislative history as "that last hope of lost
interpretive causes, that St. Jude of the hagiology of statutory construction").
37. See RONALD DwoRKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 342-47 (1986); POSNER, supra note
21, at 276-78; see also Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 116 S. Ct. 637,
645 (1996) (Scalia, J. concurring in part) ("Legislative history that does not represent the
intent of the whole Congress is nonprobative; and legislative history that does represent
the intent of the whole Congress is fanciful.").
38. For example, a stated reason for President Clinton's veto of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was a statement in the Conference Report
concerning the requirements for pleading scienter. President's Message to the House of
Representatives Returning Without Approval the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2210, 2210 (Dec. 19, 1995) [hereinafter
President's Message].
The statute requires that a complaint, for each alleged act or omission, "state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
requisite state of mind." Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-67, § 21D(b)(2), 109 Stat. 737 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)) (emphasis
added). The Conference Committee noted that under prior law, the "most stringent
pleading standard" was that of the Second Circuit, which required that the facts pleaded
in the complaint "must give rise to a 'strong inference' of the defendant's fraudulent
intent." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1995) (emphasis added).
Even though the statute adopts the Second Circuit's very words, the report went on to
comment, perhaps disingenuously: "Because the Conference Committee intends to
strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's
case law interpreting this pleading standard." Id. Notwithstanding the similar language
in both the statute and the Second Circuit rule as articulated by the Conference
Committee, the President made frequent reference in his veto message to the statements
in the Committee Report concerning rejection of the Second Circuit standard. President's
Message, supra, at 2210-11. The President noted that the Statement of Managers in the
Report "will be used by courts as a guide to the intent of Congress with regard to the
meaning of the bill." Id. at 2210. Nevertheless, on December 22, Congress enacted the
statute over the President's veto.
So far, the President's fear concerning courts' reliance on the Conference Report
has been unfounded. In Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp., 927
F. Supp. 1297, 1308-12 (C.D. Cal. 1996), the court rejected the defendant's argument
which relied on the Conference Report, and construed the statute as adopting the Second
Circuit's pleading requirement of scienter.
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In its structure, the textualist position closely resembles economic
argumentation. Both begin with an idealized model of certain aspects of
human psychology. In the case of economics, the theory is one of human
behavior in transactional situations. In the case of textualism, the theory
is one of language use and comprehension. In both instances, the
idealization is self-evidently less complicated than actual human
psychology. We know that people really are not always motivated by
wealth maximization. We also know that comprehension of language
depends on the use of a much broader range of contextual information
than textualism allows.39
Economic theory admits this gap, but argues that the idealization is
harmless, as the goal of the theory is to create a predictive model, not to
create a descriptively adequate picture of human motivation. 4 But to the
extent that human motivation is a complicated matter, the economist
argues that the idealization permits focused research, since it allows us to
bypass aspects of the human condition about which we do not have a very
good understanding. To attack economic theory successfully, an
economist would argue, one must show not only that its assumptions are
false, but that the idealizations that make them false are not innocent in
that they lead to insupportable conclusions.
Similarly, in assessing textualism, one would first want to determine
whether the interpretive devices that the theory accepts conform
adequately to the way that human beings generally understand language.
If that inquiry is answered affirmatively, then textualism is no more
problematic than is ordinary language understanding. But if textualism
is deficient in some additional ways, then we must also ask whether these
shortcomings make any difference. If they do not, then textualism should
be deemed a success. It would, in that case, succeed in eliminating
procedures that reduce the impact of the rule of law without
compromising understanding in any significant way.
Let us examine textualism by means of an example.. The centerpiece
of textualist methodology has been the plain language rule. West Virginia
University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey,41 a 1991 case, illustrates how the
debate over plain language plays out in the textual ist era. In Casey, West
Virginia University Hospital had won its § 198342 case against the state
39. See discussion infra part III.
40. Posner begins his text by making this fact clear: "Rational maximization
should not be confused with conscious calculation ... [elconomics is not a theory about
consciousness . . . . Behavior is rational when it conforms to the model of rational
choice, whatever the state of mind of the chooser." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-4 (4th ed. 1992).
41. 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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of Pennsylvania (Casey was its governor) over Medicaid reimbursement
rates that Pennsylvania was paying for treatment of Pennsylvania patients
at the hospital in West Virginia. Section 1988 authorizes a court to award
attorney's fees to successful § 1983 litigants.' The issue was whether
"a reasonable attorney's fee" in § 1988 cases includes experts' fees. The
question was an important one to the parties involved because most of the
cost of the case was for experts in medical economics.
Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion, said that attorney's
fees do not include fees for expert witnesses. He relied on the plain
language rule:
[T]he purpose of a statute includes not only what it sets out to
change, but also what it resolves to leave alone. . . . The best
evidence of that purpose is the statutory text adopted by both
Houses of Congress and submitted to the President.
"Where as here, the statute's language is plain, 'the sole
function of the court is to enforce it according to its terms.""'
In determining that the language was "plain," Scalia looked not only to
the language of the statute itself, but also to other provisions in the United
States Code that deal with the same issue. Because these other statutes
specifically referred to expert fees, he concluded that Congress, had it
wished to authorize reimbursement for expert fees, would have done so
explicitly.45
Justice Stevens, the leading anti-textualist on the Supreme Court,'
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994) provides in pertinent part: "In any action or
proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985 and 1986
of this title . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
44. Casey, 499 U.S. at 98-99 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair
Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).
45. Id. at 88 (citing, inter alia, Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
2618(d), 2619(c)(2) (1994); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2060(c),
2072(a), 2073 (1994)). Scalia's use of this canon in this case has been criticized. See T.
Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore M. Shaw, The Costs of Incoherence: A Comment on
Plain Meaning, West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, and Due Process of
Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 687, 693 (1992).
46. For example, dissenting in Deal v. United States, Stevens wrote of Scalia's
majority opinion:
Between 1968, when the statute was enacted, and 1987, when textualism
replaced common sense in its interpretation, the bench and bar seem to
have understood that [18 U.S.C. § 924(c)l applied to defendants who,
having once been convicted under § 924(c), "failed to learn their lessons
from the initial punishment" and committed a repeat offense.
508 U.S. 129, 146 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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responded in dissent. Stevens observed that Congress is forced to
override Supreme Court decisions legislatively "[o]n those occasions..
. when the Court has put on its thick grammarian's spectacles and ignored
the available evidence of congressional purpose and the teaching of prior
cases construing a statute.""
Stevens argued further that the majority opinion creates an incoherent
jurisprudence of fee shifting. The Court had held earlier that paralegal
and law clerk fees count as attorney's fees for purposes of § 1988,48 and
it is difficult to reconcile this earlier decision with the majority opinion
in Casey. Furthermore, the consequence of the majority opinion would
be to deny the recovery of expert fees available to litigants successfully
asserting rights under other statutes that shift fees to the victors in civil
rights cases. Stevens looked to the legislative history and other
indications of congressional purpose, and discovered no evidence that
Congress intended to create such a disparity.49 Thus, looking both
backward at the legislative history and forward at the consequences of the
decision, Stevens argued that the plain language should not have been the
end of the inquiry.
Stevens' prediction concerning congressional reaction to the decision
proved to be correct. Casey was decided on March 19, 1991. On
November 21, 1991, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991.0
Section 113(b) of that Act overrides the Casey decision by permitting
courts to award expert fees in civil rights actions.51  While not
dispositive, since we cannot tell how the original enacting Congress would
have reacted to Casey, a rapid congressional rebuke of a plain language
interpretation is, at the very least, some evidence that the legislature does
not believe the Court to be furthering the statute's goals. This is
especially so where, as in this case, the political party in control of
Congress at the time of the override is the same (Democratic) as it was
at the time of the statute's enactment. Below we examine some of the
linguistic facts that make this inference stronger.
47. Casey, 499 U.S. at 113.
48. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285 (1989).
49. Casey, 499 U.S. at 108-11.
50. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at various sections of 42
U.S.C. (1994)).
51. § 113(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1079. Moreover, congressional overrides of
Supreme Court cases come predominantly in plain language rule cases. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE
L. 331, 347, app. at 450-55 (1991).
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III. TEXTUALISM VS. LANGUAGE
A. Linguistics and the Allure of Textualism
I have suggested that it is useful to look at textualism in terms of an
idealized model of a particular cognitive process-the language faculty.
I have further suggested that the motivations for a legal system's
attempting such an idealization are laudable, although the experiment does
not ultimately succeed. In this section, I explore how aspects of our
linguistic competence could lead one to posit a set of interpretive
principles in which context plays a marginal role. The answer will help
to explain the allure of textualism, that is, what in our psychology permits
us to think that we can govern ourselves by virtue of a rule-governed
system expressed in language. The extent to which this aspect of
language understanding underdetermines meaning, moreover, should point
to ways in which we might expect to have difficulty applying rules
mechanically to events in the world to yield a rule-ordered regime.
During the past forty years, linguists have discovered that a great
deal of our knowledge of language is rule-governed and predictable, much
the way textualists would have it. This knowledge explains our ability to
understand, rapidly and unselfconsciously, the many new utterances we
hear and read daily without any effort or further instruction. Consider,
for example, the following simple sentence:
The yellow bus crashed into the blue car.
While context may play some role in how we interpret this sentence, our
understanding of many of its elements is well beyond doubt, whatever the
context in which it is uttered. For example, we know that the speaker is
telling us that the bus, and not the car, is yellow, and the car, and not the
bus, is blue. We know that "the blue car" is the object of the
preposition, "into." Thus, the sentence cannot be interpreted to mean that
the yellow bus and the blue car jointly crashed into some unnamed object.
And we know that the speaker is telling us that the bus crashed into the
car and not that the car crashed into the bus.
That these limitations on possible interpretations may seem trivial
reflects the fact that this knowledge is tacit and unselfconscious. But
there is nothing at all trivial about it. It follows from the fact that
sentences in English consist of certain kinds of phrases. For example,
prepositional phrases (e.g., into the blue car) have prepositional "heads"
and noun phrase "complements." Noun phrases have determiners (e.g.,
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the), nouns as their heads and adjectival modifiers. We recognize "crash"
as a verb that allows a prepositional phrase, and so on.52
These aspects of interpretation do not depend on inferences drawn
from context. Context, however, no doubt does play a role in other
aspects of the interpretation of this sentence. For example, the definite
article "the" implies that the participants in the discourse' have already
identified the particular vehicles under discussion. Prototype effects also
play a role. How hard did the bus have to hit the car for there to have
been a crash? Was it a gruesome crash, or was the impact just barely
strong enough to justify using the word "crash" at all? Crucially, these
questions have nothing to do with the aspects of meaning that follow from
the structure of the sentence.
We need not limit ourselves to the structure of phrases to find aspects
of meaning that do not seem to be context driven, but instead are driven
by the structure of language. Compare the following:53
He twice knocked intentionally.
He intentionally knocked twice.
Only in the second of these can we understand the speaker as
conveying the thought that the number of knocks was intentional.
Changing the context in which the sentence is uttered will not alter this
fact about our understanding of the scope of the adverb "intentionally."
Rather, the scope relations follow from the syntax of the sentence.
Or, take a more complicated pair:"
More than one fireman checked every building.
Every fireman checked more than one building.
The first sentence is ambiguous. It can mean either that certain particular
firemen (e.g., Bill and Fred) went around checking every building, or it
can mean that every single building got checked by more than a single
fireman. The second sentence, in contrast, lacks the equivalent of the
first reading. Obviously, context plays no role here in determining which
sentence allows an additional reading, since I have presented no context,
52. For early work that captures these generalizations, see RAY S. JACKENDOFF,
X-SYNTAX; A STUDY OF PHRASE STRUCTURE (1977). For recent theory, see NOAM
CHOMSKY, THE MINIMALIST PROGRAM 241-49 (1995).
53. See DENIS BOUCHARD, THE SEMANTICS OF SYNTAX 91 (1992) (discussing
these examples and also taking a strong position on the different roles that structurally
motivated semantics and pragmatics play in interpretation).
54. See Anna Szabolcsi, Quantifier Scope (Feb. 4, 1997) (paper presented to the
N.Y.U. Department of Linguistics).
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and since precisely the same context might motivate a speaker to utter
either of these sentences.
Finally, consider the following pair:
John saw Mary wandering around the garden.
Mary was seen by John wandering around the garden.
Again, while there are plenty of questions that might arise that require us
to consider the context in which the sentence is uttered (Who is John?
Who is Mary? What do you really mean by "wandering?"), we cannot
understand the second sentence as conveying the proposition that Mary
saw John wandering around the garden, despite the fact that the order of
the words is the same in the two sentences. 55
Linguists and philosophers of language often refer to this distinction
as one between linguistic semantics and pragmatics.-' Our
understanding of language requires us to use both types of knowledge.57
55. Interestingly, research shows that people with Williams Syndrome, a form of
developmental disability that compromises intellectual functioning but spares certain
islands of cognitive activity, are able to interpret reversible passive sentences of this type
accurately, despite serious mental retardation that impairs thought in general. This and
other similar facts have led cognitive psychologists to posit a modular approach to
cognitive processes, in which the brain has different centers for different functions, with
various interfaces to permit communication among modules. See Ursula Bellugi et al.,
Williams Syndrome: An Unusual Neuropsychological Profile, in ATYPICAL COGNITIVE
DEFICITS IN DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS: IMPLICATIONS FOR BRAIN FUNCTION 18 (Sarah
H. Broman et al. eds., 1994).
56. See, e.g., KENT BACH, THOUGHT AND REFERENCE (1987):
Without getting into the many controversies surrounding the precise nature
and goal of the linguistic enterprise, I think it is safe to say that for
linguists the semantics of an expression gives the information that a
competent speaker can glean from it independently of any context of
utterance. Whenever he hears a particular utterance of it in a given
context, he uses this information, in tandem with specific information
available in the context, to understand the speaker's communicative intent.
Id. at5.
57. Chomsky draws the distinction between knowledge of language and use of
language. See NOAM CHOMSKY, KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE 3 (1986); see also NOAM
CHOMSKY, REFLECTIONS ON LANGUAGE (1975) (discussing this perspective). The
distinction is between knowledge of the syntactic and other grammatical environments in
which certain expressions can be used, including the range of meanings contained in those
linguistic environments, and the set of inferences that a hearer must draw from context
to further understand what the speaker intended to convey. Recent research suggests that
the sharp distinction between semantics and pragmatics may not be correct. Rather,
aspects of meaning that are regular incorporate some pragmatic information. For an
account that is both sophisticated and accessible see RAY S. JACKENDOFF, THE
ARCHITECTURE OF THE LANGUAGE FACULTY (1997). For purposes of this discussion,
the precise architecture of the language faculty is not important. My point is simply that,
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As we see even from this brief discussion, the semantic portion of our
linguistic understanding includes, in addition to other things, aspects of
meaning concerning phrasal structure, the scope of adverbs and the scope
of quantifiers.
Returning to the interpretation of statutes, the greater the role that
linguistic semantics plays in interpretation, the more the textualist
experiment will succeed. Conversely, the more that contextual
information is required,58 the more room for misunderstanding without
enriched information about context and the less hope we should have for
the success of the experiment.
This understanding of the role of context in interpretation thus not
only explains what is wrong with Scalia's textualism, but it also explains
what is attractive about it. In reality, a great deal of interpretation can
and does occur independent of context.59 When ambiguity does arise,
certain aspects of context, such as surrounding text, are often relevant
hints to interpretation. To the extent that we can avoid inquiry into those
contextual areas that are murky, we can introduce certainty into the law,
and reduce the motivation for doctoring the trail of events from which
inferences about intent and purpose must be drawn." The problem, as
we shall see in detail, is that this vision of interpretation gives too much
credit to those aspects of our linguistic competence that operate
independent of context, and puts too little focus on the types of contextual
information that we actually use.
B. Where Textualism Falls Short
Notwithstanding the ability of the textualist approach to deal with a
substantial amount of interpretation with minimal analysis of contextual
information, the effort falls short. The residue of interpretation left for
pragmatics is simply too great for textualism to work. The problems
radiate from the core fact that textualism, however well-motivated, is by
with respect to certain aspects of meaning, uttering the sentence in different circumstances
will not lead to different interpretations.
58. That is, the more that pragmatic information is required apart from any
worldly knowledge incorporated into semantic rules. See JACKENDOFF, supra note 57,
at 47-82.
59. For a discussion of the relationship between linguistic and contextual
information in legal rules, see FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 38-72
(1991).
60. In many easy cases, the plain language of the statute is at peace with the
statute's purpose, adding to the attractiveness of textualism. For a discussion applauding
both the ease of applying textualism and its success in restraining judicial adventurism in
such cases, see John Copeland Nagle, Review Essay: Newt Gingrich, Dynamic Statutory
Interpreter, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 2209 (1995).
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definition a know-nothing approach; it requires that we intentionally
ignore exactly the kind of additional contextual information that we use
routinely and unselfconsciously in everyday life to understand
communications. The Court repeatedly states that words must be
understood in their context, and that words that may seem unclear on
their face become clear when one understands their context."1  But
textualist methodology limits the notion of "context" to the statutory
language surrounding the disputed words and sometimes to other sections
of the United States Code.62 This limitation is by no means necessary,
and is, as discussed below, unnatural. Similarly, textualism forbids any
consideration of the consequences of the Court's interpretation. Yet in
everyday speech, we routinely and automatically look at the consequences
of our interpretations to see if they make sense.
These interpretive problems are straightforward, and are predictable
from the structure of discourse in general. In understanding speech, we
use whatever information we have available to divine the goals of the
speaker, and then make the automatic assumption that the speaker is
acting in accordance with these goals.' Paul Grice's Cooperative
Principle captures this fact about the communication process: "Make
your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which
it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in
which you are engaged."' Grice then presents several maxims which
61. See, e.g., Brown v. Gardner, 115 S. Ct. 552, 555 (1994) (unanimous Court)
("Ambiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context. ... ");
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 229 (1993) ("Language, of course, cannot be
interpreted apart from context."); King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991)
(unanimous Court) ("iThe meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on
context.").
62. See, e.g., West Virginia Univ. Hosps..v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100 (1991)
("Where a statutory term presented to us for the first time is ambiguous, we construe it
to contain that permissible meaning which fits most logically and comfortably into the
body of both previously and subsequently enacted law."); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach.
Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ("The meaning of
terms on the statute books ought to be determined ... on the basis of which meaning.
..is... most compatible with the surrounding body of law . . . ."). When it comes to
constitutional analysis, Scalia takes the much broader view that "context is everything."
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 37.
63. See GEORGIA GREEN, PRAGMATICS AND NATURAL LANGUAGE
UNDERSTANDING 90 (2d ed. 1996).
64. Paul Grice, Logic and Conversation, in SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS 3: SPEECH
ACTS 41, 45 (P. Cole & J. Morgan eds., 1975). For a study that argues persuasively that
the canons of construction used by courts, and similar maxims used in other cultures,
derive from Grice's principles, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of
Interpretation, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1179. For an introduction to Gricean analysis with a
discussion of how Grice's work fits into legal analysis, see generally BERNARD S.
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we use to accomplish cooperation. Among them are the maxim of
quantity ("make your contribution as informative as is required for the
current purposes of the exchange,") and the maxim of relevance ("be
relevant.").'
Grice's Cooperative Principle is not intended as a prescription for
good conversational behavior, as Georgia Green points out.' Rather,
it is intended to be descriptive, characterizing what we automatically and
unselfconsciously assume discourse is about every time we hear or read
language, putting aside such issues as sarcasm, irony and so on.
Significantly, the various maxims that we use in implementing the
Cooperative Principle require us to use whatever knowledge we have to
come to an appreciation of the speaker's goals. Again, we do this every
time we listen, and we assume, again unselfconsciously, that when we
speak, the listener is making similar assumptions about us.
The notion of coherence follows from these Gricean principles as
well: "A coherent text is one where the interpreter can readily reconstruct
the speaker's plan with reasonable certainty, by inferring the relations
among the sentences, and their individual relations to the various subgoals
in an inferred plan for the enterprise understood to be at hand."67
To illustrate, assume that two men, A and B, are in a cocktail lounge
having a drink together. It is 5:30 in the afternoon, and they have agreed
to stay until 6:00, when A is supposed to meet his wife. A and B have
young children, jobs, and wives who also work, and they are talking
about the difficulties they and their wives have juggling all their
responsibilities. A finished his drink a few minutes earlier. When B
finishes his, A says to B: "Are you going to have another one?" B must
decide whether A is talking about babies or martinis. How did he
understand the remark?
To answer this question, we search as hard as we can for contextual
clues." The only one that I have included so far is the time: there are
JACKSON, MAKING SENSE IN LAW (1995). Other scholars have also used the Gricean
model of communication to explain legal issues. See Peter Tiersma, The Language of
Silence, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 99 n.34 (1995); M.B.W. Sinclair, Law and Language:
The Role of Pragmatics in Statutory Interpretation, 46 U. PrT. L. REV. 373 (1985).
65. Grice, supra note 64, at 45-46. It has been argued that Grice's principles can
be reduced to the notion that people try to make their contributions relevant, given a
detailed understanding of relevance, which essentially requires that new information take
into account the context of the communication, and then make an incremental
contribution. See generally DAN SPERBER & DIERDRE WILSON, RELEVANCE (1995).
66. GREEN, supra note 63, at 96.
67. Id. at 106.
68. These clues are relevant in determining the intended antecedent for "one," but
by no means cover our knowledge of when we can use that expression, and to what
possible antecedents "one" can refer. Rather, they apply only after we have already
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still 30 minutes remaining before A is to meet his wife. If it were already
6:00, then A would more likely be talking about babies since there would
be no time for another drink. We naturally want to know more. Exactly
what were they talking about when A asked the question? Expenses?
Vacation plans? It makes a difference. We have two inferred plans-the
evening schedule and the substance of the conversation-and we cannot
tell from the information I have provided which plan was the one that A
had in mind. Thus, even if B could understand A's question as part of a
coherent conversation, we cannot.
Significantly, to the extent that the context clarifies the situation, B
is not even likely to perceive any ambiguity even though the ambiguity
continues to exist. For example, let us say that B suffers from an
insurmountable fertility problem that has arisen since the birth of his
children, and that A. knows about this problem. A is talking about B's
having another drink, not another child-neither of them would imagine
otherwise. It is not that the word "one" has become determinate in
meaning in some abstract sense. Rather, the circumstances lead us to
infer that the speaker intended a particular referent for "one." Other
possible referents go unnoticed.
The phenomenon that context makes the indeterminacies in language
seem to disappear is quite general and routinely forms a tacit part of
statutory analysis. Consider, for example, the word "enterprise" in the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).' The
Supreme Court has on two occasions construed "enterprise." In United
States v. Turkette,7 the Court held that an arson ring counts as an
enterprise even though it is not a legitimate business entity. In National
Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler,1 the Court held that a
coalition of antiabortion groups called the Pro-Life Action Network
(PLAN) also constituted a RICO enterprise even though PLAN is not
pecuniary in nature. These were both difficult cases, in that the entities
alleged to be enterprises appear to come within the statutory definition of
limited the range of possible interpretations based on the sorts of grammatical principles
discussed above. For example, we can say, "Jack's old car runs better than Harry's new
one," but we cannot say, "Jack's car runs better than Harry's one." For a linguistic
analysis of the environments in which "one" can appear, see CARL L. BAKER,
INTRODuCTION To GENERATIVE-TRANSFORMATIONAL SYNTAX 327-42 (1978) (presenting
the examples discussed in this Article); see also ROBERT FREIDIN, FOUNDATIONS OF
GENERATIVE SYNTAX 46-47 (1992) (providing a similar but more contemporary analysis).
69. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
70. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
71. 510 U.S. 249 (1994).
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"enterprise,"' but are nonprototypical uses of the term, whether under
the statutory definitions or everyday usage.'
While these difficult cases illustrate how words generally become
indeterminate at the margins, in easy cases the indeterminacies go
unnoticed. Thus, there are large numbers of civil RICO cases in which
there is no question that an enterprise exists. These include whether the
alleged acts of racketeering activity form a pattern,74 as required under
§ 1962;" or what it means to participate in the conduct of an
enterprise;76 or what kind of injury a plaintiff must prove to be entitled
to RICO damages.'
These other RICO cases are not easier because the word "enterprise"
has become clear. The indeterminacy has not gone away. Rather,
whatever indeterminacy exists is not relevant to the dispute, and therefore
goes unnoticed. When someone offers me a glass of juice, I do not have
a fit of concern over whether the speaker has used a slang word to offer
me some electric current. That thought would never occur. However
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) provides: "'enterprise' includes any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."
73. 1 will argue below that the prototype approach to word meaning leads to
significant improvement in the interpretation of statutes. See infra part V.A. For a
discussion of the psychological literature underlying some of these observations, see
Lawrence M. Solan, Judicial Decisions and Linguistic Analysis: Is there a Linguist in the
Court?, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1069 (1995); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense,
Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105,
1172-80 (1989); see also H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,
71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958). Winter uses the notion of prototype to evaluate the
Hart/Fuller debate on the interpretation of a hypothetical statute prohibiting vehicles in the
park. Winter, supra, at 1172-80. Winter argues convincingly that Hart's position, see
Hart, supra, at 606-08, which relies on word meaning having a "core" and a
"penumbra," is consistent with linguistic research that demonstrates that our knowledge
of concepts is structured in this way, but wrong in its understanding of the implications
of that phenomenon. 1d; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L.
REV. 953, 988-89 (1995). ° I return to the concept of prototypes in language processing.
See infra part V.A.
74. E.g., H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), for example, provides; in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity . . . to use
or invest . . .any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income,
in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce.
76. E.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993); see also text
accompanying infra notes 123-33.
77. E.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
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many meanings are possible, the context determines whether words
appear to be clear or ambiguous. Thus any interpretive methodology that
commands us to ignore a significant portion of the context that we would
ordinarily use, and forces us instead to rely on "the plain language,"
dooms us to inevitable misunderstandings, as our parlor game illustrates.
Judge Posner refers to the failure to look at context in order to
evaluate the clarity of a text as the "plain meaning fallacy.""8 He
highlights the problem in a series of opinions addressing Illinois contract
law in which he reaffirms the parol evidence rule, but permits the use of
extrinsic evidence to determine whether a document suffers from what he
calls "extrinsic ambiguity."" Extrinsic ambiguity "is present when,
although the agreement itself is a perfectly lucid and apparently complete
specimen of English prose, anyone familiar with the real-world context
of the agreement would wonder what it meant with reference to the
particular question that has arisen."' The Restatement adopts a similar
position."' In contrast, "intrinsic ambiguity," according to Posner, is
ambiguity readily apparent on the face of the document.'
Posner's distinction is not susceptible to uniform application. After
all, the only difference between intrinsic and extrinsic ambiguity is the
extent to which the reader is surprised to learn that the document is
subject to numerous interpretations. The degree of surprise, in turn, is
a function of the reader's expectations, which are based in large part on
his knowledge of how subcultures use different words. A document,
therefore, may be intrinsically ambiguous to you, because you understand
the nuances of the writer's use of relevant words, but only extrinsically
ambiguous to me, because I do not.
Regardless, the thrust of Posner's point is correct. We should not
insulate ourselves from the context in which legally significant words
were uttered if we care about ascertaining what the speaker intended to
convey. Whether we see this upon our initial reading of the document
(intrinsic ambiguity), or only later after we have conducted adequate
investigation (extrinsic ambiguity) is ultimately of little significance.
The Supreme Court's pronouncements that meaning depends on
context" should be seen in this light. Context does not eliminate
78. POSNER, supra note 21, at 263-64.
79. E.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 877 F.2d 614 (7th
Cir. 1989).
80. Federal Deposit, 887 F.2d at 620.
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214(c) (1979). Comment b
remarks in part: "Even though words seem on their face to have only a single possible
meaning, other meanings often appear when the circumstances are disclosed."
82. POSNER, supra note 21, at 263-64.
83. See supra note 61-62.
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possible interpretations of an utterance. Nor does it create possible
interpretations. No amount of context will cause me to conclude that
"Bill hit John" really means, "the air conditioner on the train was broken,
and all the passengers were sweating when they got off." Rather, context
makes certain possible interpretations more salient and others less salient.
Our story of the two men in the cocktail lounge provides a good
example of this phenomenon. Let us say that A, after leaving B, is
arrested for driving while intoxicated. He claims that he and B had only
one drink, but a witness had overheard A asking B if B was going to have
another one, and B said yes, thus undermining A's credibility. For the
sake of discussion, let us assume this time that the context of the
discussion makes it clear that A and B really were talking about babies,
but the witness did not hear that part of the conversation. It is a more
complete understanding of the context that brings home the ambiguity of
a seemingly clear statement and vindicates A. But the context did not
create the ambiguity. The word "one" is indeterminate in its referent,
whether we focus on its indeterminacy or not. Rather, the context alerted
us to the presence of the ambiguity, and that it is now appropriate to
resolve the ambiguity in a manner that had not occurred to us earlier.
Of course, textualism has always recognized that the interpretation
of ambiguous statutes requires reference to information outside the statute,
just as the parol evidence rule acknowledges the need for extrinsic
evidence when a contract is ambiguous. But this recognition does not
give enough of a boost to the textualist approach to overcome our
inability to recognize the range of sensible interpretations that come to
light only after we have looked at context as an initial matter."
Whether we are attempting to interpret concepts, such as "enterprise" or
"attorney's fees," or simply to find the antecedent of a pronoun such as
"one," language is not always fully determinate. When it is not, we
ordinarily use whatever information is available to us to resolve vagueness
and ambiguity.
Let us say that we have information, such as legislative history and
evidence that the legislature is unhappy with prior court decisions, that
enables us to infer what the legislature's plan is.8" But, having adopted
84. For discussion of the overriding significance ofcontext in legal interpretation,
see PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM, AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL MIND (1996); Lessig, supra note 6, at 1174-82.
85. Although Scalia argues against the use of this sort of information on
institutional grounds, even he occasionally admits that the information may be informative.
Thus, in Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617 (1990), Scalia makes the point that
subsequent legislative history is of no use to the interpreter, by comparing it to
contemporaneous legislative history, which he claims can be much more useful:
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the methodological constraints of textualism, we deny ourselves the
opportunity to take advantage of this information." The result can be
either an incoherent interpretation, or a coherent interpretation that is off-
base because it draws the wrong inferences about the legislature's plan.
This is exactly what Stevens' Casey dissent says about Scalia's majority
opinion.87 And Stevens' observation is not new. Almost 200 years ago,
Chief Justice Marshall insightfully observed that "[wihere the mind labors
In some situations, of course, the expression of a legislator relating to a
previously enacted statute may bear upon the meaning of a provision in
a bill under consideration-which provision, if passed, may in turn affect
the judicial interpretation of the previously enacted statute, since statutes
in pari materia should be interpreted harmoniously. Such an expression
would be useful, if at all, not because it was subsequent legislative history
of the earlier statute, but because it was plain old legislative history of the
later one.
Id. at 631-32 (Scalia, J., concurring in part); see also United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S.
439, 444 (1988) (using legislative history to determine the purpose of the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978).
86. Of course, in many instances, legislative history will be inconclusive, or just
uninformative, as Scalia and many others point out. However, justices do appear to find
it helpful not only in cases in which Scalia agrees with the result reached by the majority
but thinks reference to the legislative process unnecessary, but also in cases in which other
members of the Court disagree with Scalia based in part on historical material that these
justices believe sheds light onto the overall meaning of the statute. See, e.g., City of
Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 340-49 (1994) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Scalia, writing for the majority, criticizes the dissenter's reliance on a Senate
Committee report, stating "it is the statute, and not the committee report, which is the
authoritative expression of the law." City of Chicago, 511 U.S. at 337; see also Moskal
v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 110-14 (1990) (finding legislative purpose in legislative
history). Scalia's dissent argues that perceived purpose should not override plain
meaning. Moskal, 498 U.S. at 129-31; United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S.
30, 37 (1992) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (holding that a waiver of sovereign immunity must
be unequivocally expressed in the statutory text, and not in the legislative history).
Stevens, dissenting, uses legislative history to confirm his "literal reading" of the statutory
text. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. at 41; West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83,
97-99 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (refusing to look to statements of individual legislators
where the statute is unambiguous). In contrast, the dissent by Stevens relies on legislative
history to show a broad remedial purpose behind the statute. Casey, 499 U.S. at 108-16;
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404-05 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
Court for adopting an unjustifiably broad reading of the statute after finding no indication
in the legislative history that Congress intended the narrow, ordinary meaning of a
statutory term).
87. It also accounts for what commentators remarking about this case have said
"is a Court-imposed incoherence, blind both to the manifest congressional purpose and
to the real-world consequences of the literalistic reading." Aleinikoff & Shaw, supra note
45, at 689.
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to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes everything from which
aid can be derived. " ss
Again focusing on Grice's Cooperative Principle and the concept of
coherence, Scalia's notion of context in Casey is also too broad. It is too
broad because it makes the unjustified empirical assumption that
Congress, in enacting § 1988, was focused on the wording of other fee-
shifting statutes in the United States Code, and decided to give fewer fee-
shifting benefits to successful civil rights litigants. It is equally plausible
that Congress was not trying to distinguish § 1988 from the others.
Congress may have been directing its attention to overturning the
Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society." As Stevens points out, Alyeska Pipeline prompted § 1988 and
Congress may have assumed that its enactment of § 1988 would include
whatever reimbursement is usually associated with such statutes.' In
fact, courts had been construing similar language as permitting
reimbursement for expert fees.9 One can draw the inference that
Congress focused on such substantive problems just as easily as one can
infer that Congress matched the language of this provision with that of
other Code provisions out of fear that the Supreme Court would later take
advantage of any stylistic inconsistencies in the outcome of the drafting
process.
At the same time that textualism denies the interpreter the
opportunity to investigate the context from which one ordinarily tries to
infer the goals or plan of the speaker, it also denies the necessity-even
the legitimacy-of the interpreter's considering the consequences of her
interpretation, short of a check for outright absurdity.' It is not easy
to state any reason for why Congress would have wanted to single out
victorious § 1988 civil rights litigants for less fee-shifting benefits than
those who prevail under other sections of the Code, and Scalia does not
88. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 356, 385 (1805).
89. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
90. See Aleinikoff & Shaw, supra note 45, at 694-98; William D. Popkin, An
"Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L.
REV. 1.133, 1148-50 (1992).
91. See Peter Margulies, After Marek, the Deluge: Harmonizing the Interaction
Under Rule 68 of Statutes that Do and Do Not Classify Attorney 's Fees as Costs, 73 IowA
L. REV. 413 (1988) (discussing the difficulties in interpreting fee shifting statutes);
Monique Michal, Comment, After West Virginia: The Fate of Expert Witness Fee Shifiing
in Patent Litigation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1591, 1592-93 (1992) (citing cases in which
attorney fee awards under the Patent Act had been construed to include expert witness
fees).
92. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 426-27 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1989); United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588 (1981).
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even try. Yet, by focusing only on other fee-shifting sections of the Code
without regard to the circumstances surrounding the enactment of this
particular section, the majority has concluded that is just what Congress
intended to do. The Court ignored the likely consequence of closing the
court house door to many victims of civil rights violations.' In fact,
textualism makes it illicit to try to understand this central issue because
the Court is not permitted to investigate either the motivations of the
legislators or the doctrinal consequences of its decision. Those are
considered to be exclusively in the domain of the legislature. The Court's
role, in contrast, is solely as the enforcer of legislative decisions.
Finally, Casey illustrates another problem that is very common in
plain language cases: the language in § 1988 is simply not plain. We can
just as easily understand "attorney's fees" to mean all the fees paid to an
attorney, including both fees for the attorney's services and various
disbursements such as expert fees, or we can understand it to mean the
fees paid to an attorney just for the attorney's services. This is true of all
structures involving a possessive: "Bill's wallet" can mean the wallet that
Bill has, likes, saw at Saks Fifth Avenue, etc.'
The elegance and apparent simplicity of the plain language rule
encourage courts to find language plain even when it is not. The absence
of contextual information from the analysis makes this conclusion easier
for a court to reach. The problem becomes especially vivid when courts
are confronted with a choice between applying the plain language rule, or
applying various substantive canons of construction, which dictate what
happens when language is not plain.95
For example, the rule of lenity says that criminal statutes are to be
construed strictly, with ambiguities resolved in favor of the defendant.
In many cases the language is not really plain, but the more sensible
reading of the statute-especially from the perspective of a Court as
conservative as the present one-would include the disputed events within
the scope of the statute. Thus, in Chapman v. United States," the Court
held that a statute providing a minimum sentence for distribution of one
gram or more of a "mixture or substance" containing a detectable quantity
93. Aleinikoff & Shaw, supra note 45, at 696-98.
94. See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 116 (1993) for a
discussion of the linguistic theory underlying this indeterminacy. Lessig, using his theory
of translation, appropriately characterizes this statute as one in which the source (i.e., the
text from which translation must occur) is underdetermined. See Lessig, supra note 6,
at 1203.
95. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1990). Scalia
himself recognizes this danger. See A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 27-
29.
96. 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
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of LSD,97 applied to the full weight of blotter paper impregnated with
LSD. Using the dictionary as authority, the Court held that the LSD-
soaked blotter was clearly a mixture, even though it is not, and thus
avoided triggering the rule of lenity. The tension between the substantive
canons and the goal of reaching a desired result frequently pressures the
Court to find ambiguous language plain."
Similar problems arise when battles occur over which of several
available grammatical canons should be applied in a particular case. In
Moskal v. United States," for example, the majority applied the canon
that all words in a statute be given effect, so that none are understood as
surplusage.' Justice Scalia, in dissent, focused on the canon requiring
the Court to apply the common law meaning of the disputed phrase at the
time that the statute was enacted.'' There is nothing wrong with either
of these canons. But when the inferences drawn from them conflict, they
are of little use."°
97. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v) (1994).
98. For other rule of lenity cases in which the language is arguably not plain, but
in which the Court found it plain, see Reno v. Koray, 115 S. Ct. 2021 (1995) ("official
detention" limited to detention by court order committing the detainee to custody of the
Attorney General, and thus not encompassing court-ordered confinement to a community
treatment center); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993) ("using" a gun during and
in relation to a drug trafficking crime includes trading a gun for drugs); Deal v. United
States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993) ("second or subsequent convictions" refers to finding of guilt
rather than entry of judgment, thus penalty enhancement is appropriate for five of six
counts tried together).
99. 498 U.S. 103 (1990).
100. Moskal, 498 U.S. at 109-10.
101. Id. at 128-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The disputed statutory language reads
as follows: "Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports in interstate or
foreign commerce any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities or tax
stamps, knowing the same to have been falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited.
. . shall be fined . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994) (emphasis added). The issue was
whether "falsely made" should be understood in its ordinary sense as "made to be false,"
or in its common law sense, in which the term is a synonym for "forged." The majority
took the former position; Justice Scalia, in his dissent, took the latter. See Moskal, 498
U.S. at 128-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. In A Matter Of Interpretation, Scalia marvels at the literature debunking the
canons. See A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 26 (criticizing Karl N.
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about
How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950)). An expanded
discussion of the canons is beyond the scope of this Article. My own view is much like
that of Judge Posner, who takes the position that the canons are useful guides to available
inferences, but that absent a full theory of when to apply one instead of another, they will
not help much when they produce conflicting inferences. See POSNER, supra note 21, at
279-80.
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The result: not only do courts avoid addressing important policy
issues, substituting linguistic analysis instead, but they do not even engage
in good linguistic analysis. It is only by manipulating the discussion of
language that the result can be manipulated. In fact, many cases use the
dictionary as the principal basis for the decision. °3
The textualist hypothesis, then, cannot be confirmed. Textualism
fails to achieve the degree of understanding that ordinary linguistic
processes would provide us, and the gap in understanding is not innocent.
Textualist methodology causes us to ignore contextual information that
would ordinarily change our understanding of a text, and encourages us
to find meaning plain where it is not. Moreover, as congressional
reaction to Casey and other plain language cases shows,'" Congress
does not embrace plain language decisions that are at odds with
congressional purpose that can be discovered through a review of the very
contextual information that textualism eschews. We will see in Part V
that the Court itself has not retained its textualist perspective on major
doctrinal issues.
Of course, the failure of the textualist hypothesis comes with a price.
That price is a diminution in the extent to which we can take comfort in
a rule of law. Justice Scalia is certainly right that once we start
investigating the context in which a legislature enacted a statute, and once
we begin deciding how much to interpret old statutes to conform to
current circumstances, a degree of discretion has entered the system.
Certainty is reduced. But this price, I maintain, is merely a reflection of
the structure of our cognitive capacities. Thus, we may be disappointed
in the results of the textualist experiment, but we probably should not be
surprised. In any event, disappointments in our own biological. makeup
are of little use.
103. See A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in
Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71 (1994); Lawrence Solan, Wh1en
Judges Use the Dictionary, 68 AM. SPEECH 50 (1993); Note, Looking it Up: Dictionaries
and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994).
104. See Eskridge, supra note 51, at 450-55.
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S MODIFIED TEXTUALISM
While Justice Scalia's textualist approach to statutory interpretation
has received great attention, mostly critical,' 3 the other members of the
Court do not routinely demonstrate a high level of comfort with his
methodological limitations.1 There exist numerous opinions in which
the majority appears to accept Scalia's approach. of highly technical
linguistic analysis, declaring the meaning of a statute plain based on
dictionary definitions and the like, only to add a section that deals with
legislative history."0 7 Ordinarily, the Court justifies the inclusion of the
historical section as confirming its construction of the statute's
language.' In many of these cases, Scalia concurs in the judgment,
rejecting only the portion of the majority's opinion that looks beyond the
statutory language."° In others, such as Casey, members of the Court
105. See Eskridge, supra note 3; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey,
Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 340-45 (1990);
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Strict Textualisn, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 13 (1995); Popkin, supra
note 21, at 888-89; Zeppos, supra note 3; John Polich, Note, The Ambiguity of Plain
Meaning: Snith v. United States and the New Textualism, 68 So. CAL. L. REV. 259
(1994).
106. For example, in Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, Justice White, writing
on behalf of all the justices except for Scalia, remarked:
As for the propriety of using legislative history at all, common sense
suggests that inquiry benefits from reviewing additional information rather
than ignoring it. . . . Legislative history materials are not generally so
misleading that jurists should never employ them in a good-faith effort to
discern legislative intent. Our precedents demonstrate that the Court's
practice of utilizing legislative history reaches well into its past. We
suspect that the practice will likewise reach well into the future.
501 U.S. 597, 611-12 n.4 (1991) (citation omitted).
107. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 179-83 (1993); INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432-43 (1987); P.U.D. No. I v. Washington Dep't of
Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 720-23 (1994).
108. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 n.29 (1978)
(analyzing legislative history, despite unambiguous statutory language, to meet dissenter's
objection that "absurd" result reached by the Court is at odds with legislative intent);
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993) (discussing legislative purpose to
bolster finding of unambiguity); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987)
(examining legislative history to determine if plain language contravenes a "clearly
expressed legislative intention"); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983) ("If
it is necessary to turn to the legislative history ... one finds that history does not reveal
a limited congressional intent."); see also Eskridge, supra note 3, at 626-40
(providing a historical discussion of this perspective on the use of legislative history).
109. See, e.g., Reves, 507 U.S. at 170 (Scalia, J., joining all but legislative history
discussion); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 603 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring);
United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 371 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment);
United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344-46 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part);
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making use of statutory interpretation and Scalia are on opposite
sides."'
This limited use of legislative history-to confirm what detailed
grammatical analysis has independently taught the Court about the intent
of Congress-is itself textualist in nature, even if it is less
methodologically constrained than Scalia's textualism. A glance at the
history of the statute's enactment can be of some use in telling a court
whether its proposed interpretation is so at odds with what the legislature
was considering as to constitute an obvious misreading. Moreover, no
Supreme Court justice, as far as I know, has rejected the absurd result
rule as a canon of construction. To some extent, we can measure the
notion of absurdity by determining whether the interpretation to which the
plain language seems to lead us is wildly at odds with what the legislative
history tells us that the legislature had in mind.
Though less restrained than Scalia's, this modified textualism
continues to look only backward in time to the language used by the
legislature and to the events that led to that language being adopted. The
approach is not dynamic, as Eskridge puts it.' Moreover, by looking
at the context only as a post hoc check against obvious errors, the Court
underutilizes the information that it is willing to consider. As the Gricean
model shows, we commonly use this sort of contextual information to
help us understand in the first place, not only as protection against
absurdity after the fact.
The most glaring omission is the absence of any analysis of the
doctrinal consequences of the Court's interpretation. Even as modified,
textualism takes the position that the legislature has spoken, and that it is
not appropriate for the Court to consider the wisdom of the legislature's
decisions. 12
One may be tempted to conclude that this approach reflects a
repudiation of Scalia's textualism. But such a conclusion would be too
strong. While most members of the Court adhere to the tradition of
looking at legislative history notwithstanding Scalia's protests, the
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
110. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328
(1994) (opinion of Scalia, J.); United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992)
(opinion of Scalia, J.); Chisom v. Romer, 501 U.S. 380 (Scalia, J., dissenting); West
Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1994) (opinion of Scalia, J.); Moskal v.
United States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (1994).
112. For a recent discussion of negative consequences flowing from the Court's
failure to consider in advance the doctrinal consequences of its plain language decisions,
see Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A
Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 35, 97-98 (1996).
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structure of the argumentation has changed, with Scalia's thumbprint
apparent even where his signature is absent."' To see how this has
happened, let us compare the structure of the arguments in Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill,"4 the most prominent plain language case of
the Burger Court," 5 and Reves v. Ernst & Young,"' a 1993 case that
employs the Court's more recent modified textualism.
A. The Snail Darter Case: Plain Language in the Burger Court
In Hill, the issue was whether an agency's allowing the floodgates of
the already-constructed Tellico Dam to close, which would lead to the
extinction of the snail darter, constituted an "action" that "jeopardize[d]
the continued existence of [an] endangered species... or result[ed] in the
destruction or modification of habitat of such species."" 7 In an opinion
written by Chief Justice Burger, the Court answered this question
affirmatively, and enjoined the opening of the dam.
The Court's holding in Hill was that the plain language of the statute
must prevail:
One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose
terms were any plainer than those in § 7 of the Endangered
Species Act. Its very words affirmatively command all federal
agencies "to insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried
out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence" of an
endangered species or "result in the destruction or modification
113. In a very informative article, Professor Merrill quantifies this phenomenon.
See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualisn and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 351 (1994). According to his tally, the majority opinions in all 69 statutory
interpretation cases decided by the Supreme Court in the 1981 term made reference to
legislative history, while only 12 of 66 (18%) did so in the 1992 term. Correspondingly,
there was an increase from one case in 1981 to 22 cases in 1992 in which the Court relied
on a dictionary. Id. at 355.
114. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
115. Eskridge discusses Hill as the prototypical case of what he calls the "soft
plain meaning rule," i.e, the Court's traditional position that strong legislative history can
trump statutory language when the two seem to be at odds. See Eskridge, supra note 3,
at 627-28. Here, I focus on the fact that even where plain meaning prevailed, the Court
had traditionally been more interested in legislative purpose than with which dictionary
to use. This, as I show below, has changed in the age of textualism, even in cases in
which the Court looks at legislative history.
116. 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
117. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976).
1997:235
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
of habitat of such species." . . . This language admits of no
exceptions.i'
Yet, the Court devoted exactly one paragraph in a long opinion to the
language of the statute.
In contrast, the Court devoted some fourteen pages of the United
States Reports to discussing the legislative history,"1 9 and many more
pages discussing the relevance of congressional action concerning the dam
subsequent to the enactment of the Endangered Species Act. While
counting the pages devoted to each argument may not be a scientific
measure of the Court's focus, anyone reading Hill will inevitably
conclude that the thrust of the opinion is about the purpose of the
Endangered Species Act as reflected in the congressional debate and
subsequent congressional action, and that the plain language was more or
less assumed. The Court, indeed, acknowledged in a footnote the maxim
that "when confronted with a statute which is plain and unambiguous on
its face, we ordinarily do not look to legislative history as a guide to its
meaning,"" 2 and blamed the dissent's misunderstandings for forcing it
to discuss the matter at all. Nonetheless, this "plain language" opinion
is about legislative purpose-not about dictionaries, which played no role
in the majority opinion.
In fact, the Hill Court was so acutely aware of the economic
consequences of its decision that its foray into legislative history was
partially motivated by the need to explain how a court could cause such
extensive waste of time and resources. The Court explained:
Concededly, this view of the Act will produce results requiring
the sacrifice of the anticipated benefits of the project and of
many millions of dollars in public funds. But examination of
the language, history, and structure of the legislation under
review here indicates beyond doubt that Congress intended
endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities.'
In keeping with the Gricean model, the Court recognized that establishing
the goals of the speaker is central to interpretation and thus concentrated
its efforts on this issue.
118. Hill, 437 U.S. at 173 (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 174-87.
120. Id. at 184 n.29.
121. Id. at 174.
Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases
B. Legislative History in the Textualist Court
The rhetorical style of Hill-brief discussion of statutory language
followed by extensive discussion of non-linguistic issues-is characteristic
of the pre-Scalia Court, but is very different from the Court's recent
style. Reves, one of many Supreme Court cases that interpret RICO, is
a good illustration of the Court's use of its recent method of augmenting
an otherwise textualist opinion with discussion of legislative history. The
issue in Reves was the interpretation of § 1962(c), which makes it
unlawful for "any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in . . .interstate commerce, to conduct or participate, directly
or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprises's affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity. "I'
Lenders to a Farmers Cooperative had been misled because the Co-
op overvalued its principal asset-a gasohol plant-by millions of dollars.
Ernst & Young (actually its predecessor, Arthur Young) had been
working with the Co-op and had prepared the financial statements. While
a note in the financial statement disclosed the problem, a short version,
distributed at the Co-op's annual meeting, did not. This condensed
report, it was claimed, induced certain individuals to invest money in
what was an insolvent entity. The investors lost their money.
Ernst & Young was found to have committed securities fraud. The
issue in Reves was whether it also could be liable under RICO. The
Supreme Court held that the plain language of the statute requires that a
defendant participate in the operation or management of the enterprise.
Thus, there was no liability under RICO.
Justice Blackmun, who was generally not inclined to rely on
dictionaries, wrote the majority opinion and headed straight for the
dictionary. Blackmun relied heavily on the definition of the verb
"conduct," which the dictionary defined as, "to lead, run, manage, or
direct." He then made the less than logical leap to the conclusion that the
noun, "conduct," being a cognate of the verb, must be given the same
definition. " Thus, the majority held, participation, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs requires that the
defendant participate in the operation or management of the enterprise.
Since Ernst & Young clearly did not conduct the affairs of the
Cooperative in this sense, it could not be held liable under RICO. The
plain language rule prevailed.
122. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1994)'(emphasis added).
123. Reves, 507 U.S. at 177-78.
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Having found the language clear, the Court then took the next step:
"This test finds further support in the legislative history of § 1962. " 1u
Committee reports make frequent mention of the need to prohibit "the
control or operation" of business through racketeering activity."z This
support, however, is quite weak, because the goal of prohibiting the use
of racketeering in the operation of an enterprise says little about the role
that particular potential defendants must play in this operation to be held
liable.
Somewhat stronger was the remark of Representative Cellar, the
chairman of the House Judiciary Committee that voted on RICO in 1970.
Cellar commented that RICO would prohibit "conduct of the affairs of a
business by a person acting in a managerial capacity through racketeering
activity."" Similarly, Senator McClellan reassured those who thought
that RICO would be too strong that the statute's scope would be limited
to individuals who "use [a] pattern [of racketeering activity] to obtain or
operate an interest in an interstate business."1
This use of legislative history to confirm the Court's understanding
of the statutory language is typical of the modified textualism that the
Court frequently employs. The Court has taken background information
into account to confirm the reasonableness of its understanding of the
statutory language. But while this brand of textualism fits the Gricean
model of communication better than Scalia's version of textualism does,
it still leaves interpretive gaps. The legislative history brought to bear on
interpretation in Reves is relatively straightforward, but the text is not.
Ordinarily, we interpret text according to what makes sense in light of
whatever background information we have already absorbed. This is the
major teaching of Grice. We would not, as the majority in Reves did,
determine in advance that rather murky language is in fact plain, and then
confirm the accepted reading by looking at the background facts later.
Scalia and Thomas signed on to all but the section of the majority
opinion in Reves that discussed statutory history. The dissent, written by
Justice Souter, ignored the legislative history and adopted the pure
textualist perspective. Its focus was on the majority's effort to make the
noun and verb, "conduct" and "conduct," equivalent in meaning. The
dissent looked up the noun in the dictionary, and found it to mean
"carrying out." 28  Since financial reports are the responsibility of
management, and since Ernst & Young both assisted management in
124. Id. at 179.
125. See id. at 180-81 (citing various committee reports).
126. Id. at 182 (citing 116 CONG. REc. 35,196 (1970) (statement of Rep. Cellar)).
127. Id. at 183 (citing 116 CONG. REc. 18,940 (1970) (statement of Sen.
McClellan)).
128. Reves, 507 U.S. at 188.
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preparing the reports and made presentations to the board on behalf of
management, the dissent concluded that the language of the statute could
easily support a conclusion that Ernst & Young participated indirectly in
the conduct of the enterprise's affairs.
Reves actually presented a significant doctrinal issue. Federal courts
have been grappling for two decades with the scope of RICO. The statute
is drafted in broad terms, and is seemingly abused by plaintiffs seeking
treble damages and attorney's fees.' Why did the Court not admit that
the statute is unclear with respect to how much involvement constitutes
direct or indirect participation in the Cooperative's conduct and address
the question as a serious jurisprudential issue? One answer may simply
be the Court's commitment to textualism as a methodology. Another is
that RICO has a legislative note, which provides that "the provisions of
this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes."" 3°  Contradicting this legislative statement is the rule of
lenity, which requires that ambiguities in the statute be resolved in the
defendant's favor, at least in criminal applications."' Faced with these
irreconcilably inconsistent principles for resolving ambiguity in RICO, the
Court simply found RICO to be a clear statute, thus averting an
interpretive crisis. This case is typical of the Supreme Court's handling
of RICO cases over the years. 32
My point is not that clear, understandable language should always
yield to speculation about what a legislature had in mind. To the
contrary, often enough the legislature will have said clearly enough what
it had in mind when it enacted the statute. This is especially true in easy
cases, where the disputed events are prototypical instantiations of the
concepts contained in the statute. That is the attraction of textualism.
Rather, my point is that application of a methodology that insists that we
ignore information that anchors our understanding of the world is so
inconsistent with our cognitive strategies for interpreting ordinary
language, and so full of its own risks of creating misunderstanding, that
129. See Philip A. Lacovara & Geoffrey F. Aronow, The Legal Shakedown of
Legitimate Business People. The Runaway Provisions of Private Civil RICO, 21 NEw ENG.
L. REV. 1 (1985-86); Marvin G. Pickholz, The Firestorm Over Civil RICO, 71 A.B.A.
J. 78 (1985); Curtis Roggow, Note, Of Rum, Rights and RICO: Are Plaintiffs Intoxicated
With The Power of Civil RICO? What Is Falling Victim to the Statute? 40 DRAKE L. REV.
577 (1991).
130. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947, 1073 (1970) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1961 (1994)).
131. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985). Sedima was
a five-to-four decision in which both the majority and the dissent found RICO clear with
respect to the type of injury that Civil RICO requires, but came to opposite conclusions
about the meaning of this "clear" language.
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it should require very strong justification. In fact, the justification must
be so compelling that it induces us to accept an otherwise unnecessarily
high rate of incoherence, a price that no one has advocated paying. The
Supreme Court's modification of the textualist methodology does not
remove much of this incoherence.
V. BREAKING AWAY
In the midst of considerable criticism from scholars, and obviously
failed efforts to interpret statutes both according to their plain language
and according to what appears to be Congress' purpose in enacting the
statute, the Supreme Court appears to be moving in two directions. Both
lead to more considered decision making in statutory cases. First, Justice
Scalia is expanding his textualist position to recognize that the
interpretation of language requires analysis of how far a particular use of
a word strays from the ordinary or prototypical meaning of a statutory
term. In essence, Scalia has begun to use the prototype as a surrogate for
investigating the evil that Congress was most likely addressing, with the
result of much more thoughtful analysis. At the same time, Justice
Stevens has shown progress in his long-fought battle against worship of
the text. While the Court continues to rely on the dictionary and to
analyze remote sections of the United States Code, it has, in several
recent cases, taken huge steps toward considering both the history of the
statute's enactment and the jurisprudential consequences of its decisions.
Interestingly, these two developments are well-illustrated by two cases
that interpret the same statute, § 924(c)(1) of the Criminal Code: Smith
v. United States'33 and Bailey v. United States."3
A. Using Prototypes to Expand the Text
In Smith v. United States, the defendant had travelled to Florida in
his van to attempt to procure some cocaine. Smith's Floridian contact,
however, had turned into a government informant. At a meeting between
Smith, the informant, and undercover government agents, Smith tried to
arrange to trade a machine gun for some drugs. When the agents left,
133. 508 U.S. 223 (1993). This case is discussed in several papers published in
a symposium issue of the Washington University Law Quarterly. See Clark D.
Cunningham & Charles J. Fillmore, Using Common Sense: A Linguistic Perspective on
Judicial Interpretations of "Use a Firearm, "73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159 (1995); Michael L.
Geis, The Meaning of Meaning in the Law, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1125 (1995); Solan, supra
note 73; see also John Polich, Note, The Ambiguity of Plain Meaning: Smith v. United
States and the New Textualism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 259 (1994).
134. 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995).
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purportedly to get the drugs, Smith bolted. He was subsequently arrested
after a high-speed chase. Smith was convicted of using a machine gun in
the course of attempting to procure cocaine, and sentenced to the thirty-
year mandatory prison sentence. The governing statute imposes a five-
year sentence if the defendant, "during and in relation to any crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime[,] uses or carries a firearm." 135
When the firearm is a machine gun, the minimum is thirty years.
The Supreme Court affirmed Smith's conviction in an opinion written
by Justice O'Connor. Keeping to textualist form, she relied most heavily
on the definitions of "use" in many dictionaries. They provided such
helpful hints as "to convert to one's service" and "to employ."" 3
Substituting the definitions for the word itself, the majority found
that attempting to trade a gun for drugs is one way of using the gun, and
therefore upheld the conviction. O'Connor also relied on such maxims
as "[w]hen a word is not defined by statute, we normally construe it in
accord with its ordinary or natural meaning, " 131 and "[I]anguage, of
course, cannot be interpreted apart from context. The meaning of a word
that appears ambiguous if viewed in isolation may become clear when the
word is analyzed in light of the terms that surround it." 3 '
Absent from the majority opinion is any discussion of legislative
history. Instead, the Court noted that in enacting § 924(c)(1), Congress
"was no doubt aware that drugs and guns are a dangerous
combination, "39 and cited statistics on drug-related murders published
by the American Enterprise Institute. A review of committee reports for
the various iterations of the statute does not reveal any discussion about
the outer limits of "use" in any event.140
Cass Sunstein argues that the majority in Smith merely offered a
"bow in the direction of literalism," but that the Court was really arguing
analogically: the evil that the statute was intended to address is similar
enough to the evil in this case to permit application of the statute.14' I
agree with Sunstein that analogical reasoning about the statute's purpose
is appropriate here. But I do not agree with Sunstein's characterization
of what the Court did. For example, in rejecting the rule of lenity, the
Court stated: "Not only does petitioner's use of his MAC-10 fall squarely
within the common usage and dictionary definitions of the terms 'uses.
135. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994).
136. Smith, 508 U.S. at 228-29.
137. Id. at 228.
138. Id. at 229.
139. Id. at 240.
140. The legislative history is summarized in Cunningham & Fillmore, supra note
133, at 1189-1203.
141. SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 87.
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S.. a firearm,' but Congress affirmatively demonstrated that it meant to
include transactions like petitioner's as '[usling a firearm' by so
employing those terms in § 924(d)." 4 2 To the extent that there is any
reference at all in Smith to the evil that the statute was intended to
address, the discussion is based on the broad interpretation of "use" that
comes from the dictionary definitions and statutory language.
It is not irrational, in my opinion, to decide that a statute that
imposes harsh penalties for using a gun in a drug crime should apply to
instances in which a defendant places a machine gun into the stream of
commerce as part of a drug deal. This is especially so if one understands
the purpose of the statute's long prison sentences to be the incarceration
of those who make society more dangerous by introducing firearms into
the commerce of illegal drug trade. But the language of the statute
certainly does not necessitate this result (to the contrary, it must be
stretched a bit to reach it), and the dictionary approach of the majority
does not even allow for intelligent debate about the matter. 43 Justice
Scalia's dissent, on the other hand, does.
Scalia agreed with O'Connor that ordinary meaning should prevail.
But Scalia disagreed with the way in which O'Connor attempted to
discover ordinary meaning. First, Scalia focused not on the meaning of
"use," but on the meaning of the whole phrase, "use a firearm." Most
significantly, Scalia stepped away from the dictionary. He argued instead
that when we use the expression, "use a gun," we are most typically
thinking in terms of using the gun as a weapon, not merely as an object
of value that can be bartered: "When someone asks, 'Do you use a cane?'
he is not inquiring whether you have your grandfather's silver-handled
walking-stick on display in the hall; he wants to know whether you walk
with a cane." 144
142. Smith, 508 U.S. at 240.
143. Sunstein's approach, of course, does permit just the right kind of debate, My
only disagreement is with Sunstein's excessively generous treatment of the reasoning
contained in the majority opinion.
144. Smith, 508 U.S. at 242 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Writing about his dissent in
Smith, Scalia comments in A Matter Of Interpretation:
Now I cannot say whether my colleagues in the majority voted the way
they did because they are strict-construction textualists, or because they
are not textualists at all. But a proper textualist, which is to say my kind
of textualist, would surely have voted to acquit. The phrase "uses a gun"
fairly connoted use of a gun for what guns are normally used for, that is,
as a weapon.
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 24.
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Scalia's approach is inconsistent with his own heavy reliance on the
dictionary in many other cases, 45 but is entirely consistent with his
concurring opinion in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be
determined, not on the basis of which meaning can be shown to
have been understood by a larger handful of the Members of
Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning is (1) most
in accord with context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely
to have been understood by the whole Congress which voted on
the words of the statute (not to mention the citizens subject to
it), and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law
into which the provision must be integrated-a compatibility
which, by a benign fiction, we assume Congress always has in
mind. 7
Investigation into the ordinary meaning of the words in a statute provides
the best surrogate for understanding Congress' most likely intention. 48The difference between the O'Connor and Scalia approaches has
serious ramifications. O'Connor uses the dictionary to determine the
outer boundaries of the meaning of the word, and asks whether the events
in dispute fit somewhere within the boundary. If so, then the plain
meaning of the statute includes the litigated events. Scalia, in contrast,
proposes a three-step process. First, assume that Congress had in mind
the ordinary, or prototypical, use of the statutory term. Second,
determine what that ordinary use is, not with reference to dictionary
definitions, but instead by introspection and reference to one's experience
in using the language, which is far more subtle than the brief space
afforded the lexicographer. Third, make a determination as to whether
the event in dispute strays too far from the prototypical use of the word
to regard this use as ordinary. In essence, Scalia promotes an approach
in which the goal of the court is to determine whether the disputed event
strays sufficiently far from the prototypical instance of the statutory ban
to take the event outside the "ordinary meaning" of the statute.
145. See Solan, supra note 103, at 51; Note, supra note 103, at 1439 n.14.
146. 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
147. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
148. Scalia must also regard this as a "benign fiction," since we really have no
idea how Congress is using the words in the statute. As we have seen, his other benign
fiction, that Congress keeps in mind all of the other instances in the United States Code
that use the same statutory words that are used in the disputed statute, is not so benign
after all. See Aleinikoff & Shaw, supra note 45, at 691-98; Popkin, supra note 90, at
1148-52.
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Scalia's approach in Smith is consistent with the substantial
psychological literature showing that we understand concepts by reference
to prototypes, rather than by absorbing definitions. 49 The classic study
was performed by Eleanor Rosch.' 5 Testing Berkeley students, Rosch
found that there was very strong consensus in ranking "items rated as
very good examples of the category."' For example, when asked to
rank various words on a 1 to 7 scale on how good they were as examples
of furniture, "chair" received an average score of 1.04, "piano" received
an average score of 3.64, and "telephone" scored 6.68.152 Part of our
knowledge of language, then, appears to include intuitions about how well
concepts fit into categories.
Significantly, this ability is necessarily culture-bound. Rosch did not
even think of listing "sari" in her list of examples of clothing, and
"canoeing" scored a 1.41 as an example of a sport.'53 It is likely that
the Berkeley students of the 1970s would rank canoeing higher than
would people living where there is no water, inner city children, and
other groups."' This means that notwithstanding its textualist
orientation, Scalia's approach cannot ask about how a word is
"ordinarily" used without assuming a particular group of speakers. In
this case, that group consists of the members of Congress. Once we
begin asking how members of Congress would ordinarily use the words
contained in statutes, we begin to approach serious inquiry into the intent
of the drafters. In essence, the inquiry into whether the disputed events
are sufficiently prototypical to fit within the statute is providing a
149. For an excellent summary of this work and other theories concerning the
formation of concepts, see MARY B. HowEs, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN COGNITION
178-219 (1990). 1 do not take the position that prototypes provide anything even
approaching a complete theory of the structure of the knowledge that we have about the
words we use or the concepts that underlie them. Rather, prototypes provide a means for
assessing the probability of what a speaker intends to convey. For a discussion of more
recent developments in psychological research, which accept the prototype theory up to
a point, but add additional knowledge of theory-driven categorization, see Douglas L.
Medin, Concepts and Conceptual Structure, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1469 (1989). For a
recent linguistic analysis of other aspects of the structure of word meaning, see generally
JAMES PUSTEJOVSKY, THE GENERATIVE LEXICON (1995).
150. See Eleanor Rosch, Cognitive Representations of Semantic Categories, 104
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GENERAL 192 (1975).
151. Id. at 198.
152. Id. app. at 229.
153. Id. at 232-33.
154. Some categories, such as color categories and other perceptual categories like
shapes, may have an innately determined prototype. People have an easier time
identifying certain "focal" colors regardless of the color vocabulary in the language they
speak natively. See id. at 194.
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substitute for an inquiry about legislative intent in a textual ist era in which
such inquiries are considered improper.
One can agree with this approach, but disagree with Scalia's
resolution of this case. That is, one can argue that Congress would have
intended a broad interpretation of "use" to encompass instances in which
guns were used in the commerce of drug trade. Thus, the prototype
approach to the interpretation of word meaning allows for focused
disagreement, even if the debate occurs through the back door.
B. Expanding the Inquiry
In the past two terms, the Supreme Court has decided several cases
in which it has employed the rhetoric of textualism, but has also engaged
in substantive analysis of the issues that goes beyond Scalia's dissent in
Smith. Probably the most dramatic is Bailey v. United States,155
decided in December 1995. Bailey involved the same statute that was
interpreted in Smith. In Bailey, the defendant was convicted of having a
gun in the trunk of his automobile while transporting drugs in the front
console. The issue again was whether the gun was being "used" during
and "in relation to" a drug trafficking crime. In a related case, Robinson
v. United States, which was decided with Bailey, the defendant had a gun
in a locked trunk in her bedroom. The gun was recovered when federal
agents executed a search warrant as part of a drug bust. The issue in
Robinson was the same.
Again, Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion, but this time it was for
a unanimous Supreme Court. Again, she began with a recital of
dictionary definitions of "use." But this time, citing the same definitions,
she wrote: "These various definitions of "use" imply action and
implementation." 1" In fact, they do not. If I say, "we use solar panels
to heat our house," I do not mean to imply any action on my part, even
though I have "employed" the solar panels. The Court then relied on the
same maxims that it had in the Smith case: "[Tihe meaning of statutory
language, plain or not, depends on context." 157 But this time, the
Court concluded that the maxims, like the dictionary definition, require
"active employment" of the gun, and hiding a gun near the drug
trafficking activity is not "active" enough.
In illustrating its point, the Court used (without attribution) this
example from Cunningham and Fillmore's article about the Bailey case:
155. 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995).
156. Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 506.
157. Id. (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 115 S. Ct. 552, 555 (1994)).
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"I use a gun to protect my house, but I've never had to use it. " ' The
Court held that it is only the second, active sense of use that triggers the
statute. Drawing on terminology from the linguistic literature,
Cunningham and Fillmore argued that this distinction reflects a "common
sense" interpretation, since we ordinarily use "use" in what they call the
"eventive" sense. 5 When we use the word in the other, designative
sense, we generally add a phrase or clause describing the special purpose,
such as "for protection," or "to protect my house." Because the statute
has no such purpose clause, they argue in part, it is more likely that
Congress intended to use "use" in the eventive sense, and we
unselfconsciously lean toward that interpretation even though the broader
interpretation is possible.
This mode of analysis, which O'Connor adopted on behalf of the
entire Court in Bailey, resembles Scalia's approach in Smith, but is at
odds with her approach in the earlier case. First, the Court does not seek
to find the outer limits of the word, but rather attempts to ascertain the
most likely meaning in light of everyday usage. Second, although the
Court paid its usual homage to the dictionary earlier in the opinion, the
more subtle analysis was performed by introspection-looking at what
appear to be relevant examples of similar linguistic phenomena, and
drawing conclusions about ordinary usage from them."
158. See Cunningham & Fillmore, supra note 133, at 1186. The authors present
the following fictional dialogue:
This is the gun I use for domestic protection.
Have you actually used it?
No, thank God, I've never had to use it.
Id.; see also Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 505.
159. Cunningham & Fillmore, supra note 133, at 1161 ("Thus far in our analysis,
the methods of linguistics serve to bring to conscious awareness the 'common sense' that
judges share with all native speakers about everyday language.").
160. Bailey and Robinson refer extensively to the Cunningham and Fillmore article
in their reply brief, dated August 1995. At the time the brief was filed, the article had
not yet been published, but a copy of the proofs was lodged with the clerk. See
Petitioner's Reply Brief, 1995 WL 517580 at iii, Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501
(1995) (Nos. 94-7448, 94-7492). Publication of the article occurred by the time the Court
issued its opinion in December of that year.
The Court's decision not to acknowledge Cunningham and Fillmore is interesting.
Cunningham and Fillmore accurately describe their analysis as bringing to "conscious
awareness" that which we "know" anyway. That is, we already know how to use "use,"
although we may not already know how to characterize that knowledge. Obviously, it is
not necessary that a linguist (Fillmore in this case) be the one to point out the
linguistically relevant distinctions, and the Court most likely did not want to give the
impression that it was encouraging the development of a cottage industry of linguists
telling judges what statutes mean. See Marc R. Poirier, On Whose Authority?: Linguists'
Claim of Expertise to Interpret Statutes, 73 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 1025 (1995) (discussing
this issue). On the other hand, as Bailey illustrates, linguistic analysis can sometimes
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What is especially noteworthy about Bailey is what the Court says
after it is done with its textual analysis. First, the Court turned to other
sections of the Code, as it had done in Smith. Then the Court turned to
the "amendment history" of § 924(c). An earlier version of the statute
referred to defendants who "use[] a firearm to commit any felony which
may be prosecuted in a court of the United States."161 The 1986
version, which was in issue in both Smith and Bailey, punishes defendants
who "use[] or carr[y] a firearm" "during and in relation to any crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime."162 O'Connor inferred from this
history that while the change in statutory language might reflect Congress'
intent to use "use" expansively, thus supporting the Court's earlier
holding in Smith, it should not be interpreted so broadly as to encompass
carrying a firearm, because § 924(c)(1) deals separately with those who
"'carry" a gun. Thus, § 924(c)(1), the Court argued, punishes those who
use a firearm (in the active sense) and punishes those who carry a
firearm, but does not punish those who merely possess a firearm. The
disposition of the case was a remand to the district court to determine
whether the defendants were carrying the weapons. 16
At the end of the opinion, the Court examines the doctrinal
ramifications of its holding. It begins by giving examples of actions that
are punishable under the statute as interpreted: "brandishing, displaying,
bartering, striking with, and most obviously, firing or attempting to fire,
a firearm. . . . [A] reference to a firearm calculated to bring, about a
change in the circumstances of the predicate offense is a 'use,' just as the
silent but obvious and forceful presence of a gun on a table can be a
'use.'" ' Responding to the government's argument that bringing a
gun along on a drug deal as a protective measure nonetheless serves the
purpose of emboldening the defendant and therefore legitimately can be
seen as a form of use, the Court notes:
bring relevant insight into statutory analysis. Thus, the Court, quite appropriately, in my
opinion, took advantage of what it could learn from linguistic analysis about our everyday
use of language, but did not create the misimpression that it was "relying" on the analysis
in any authoritative sense.
161. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1968) (quoted in Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 507).
162. Id.
163. Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 509. It is much more difficult to determine whether
Bailey was carrying a gun than whether Robinson was. The prototype analysis used by
Scalia in his dissent in Smith is the appropriate way to approach the question: Does
driving with a gun in the trunk of one's car come close enough to the ordinary or
prototypical sense of "carrying" a gun? There may be disagreement as to the answer, but
debate will be focused on the doctrinal issue facing the court.
164. Id. at 508.
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In our view, "use" cannot extend to encompass this action. If
the gun is not disclosed or mentioned by the offender, it is not
actively employed, and it is not "used." To conclude otherwise
would distort the language of the statute as well as create an
impossible line-drawing problem. How "at the ready" was the
firearm? Within arm's reach? In the room? In the house?
How long before the confrontation did he place it there? Five
minutes or 24 hours? Placement for later active use does not
constitute "use." ... 16
Were we to keep our focus only on the text, we would have to conclude
that the government is right, at least in some cases (but not Bailey's case).
A defendant who places a gun under his car seat, "just in case," and
conducts the drug transaction in the front seat of his car may well be said
to be using the gun."6
But the Court's questions stray far from dictionary considerations.
Rather than pretending not to be doing any interpretation at all, the Court
admits the indeterminacy of language that it had only recently found clear.
Further, the Court asks about the consequences of its decision to future
cases. Of course, the Court appropriately insists on continuing to pay
close attention to the statutory language. But here, it goes farther than the
limited inquiry that Scalia's prototype analysis in Smith permits. Rather,
staying within the general confines of the statutory language, the Court
is making law and it is deciding what kind of law to make by looking
seriously at the doctrinal consequences of its decision.
Bailey is thus a recognition that concepts can be indeterminate at the
margins and that decisionmakers must decide what to do when that
happens. Typically, the Court has been very reluctant to make such a
concession to the frailty of the rule of law in recent years. In that regard,
Bailey is a refreshing departure, both in its serious approach to the
decision making process and in its acknowledgement that our linguistic
capacity takes us only so far. As in its Locke decision ten years
earlier, 67 the Court in Bailey combines talk of text with a serious
consideration of the consequences of its decision. Bailey goes a long way
toward instantiating the Gricean model. It asks not only what the words
of the statute say, but looks backward and forward in time for contexts
that will help to construe the language coherently in terms of the
legislature's intent and the statute's goals.
165. id. at 508-09.
166. 1 thank Steve Winter for this example.
167. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985); see also supra part I.
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Bailey is not unique. In 1995, the Court also decided New York
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Co., 6s in which it abandoned the dictionary-oriented plain
language approach to interpreting the preemption provision of ERISA.
The unanimous opinion, written by Justice Souter, went "beyond the
unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty of defining its key term
['relate to'], and look[ed] instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute
as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would
survive. ""
In past decisions, the Court had relied heavily on the dictionary, and
interpreted "relate to" broadly, holding that ERISA's plain language
preempts a host of state legislative efforts to provide pension and/or
health benefit protections." In District of Columbia v. Greater
Washington Board of Trade, for example, the Court used Black's Law
Dictionary and the "ordinary meaning" rule to invalidate a portion of the
District of Columbia workers' compensation statute that provided for
workers to receive continued health benefits.17'
In Blue Cross & Blue Shield, however, the Court evaluated the
statutory history and the ultimate purpose of the statute in upholding a
New York provision that requires the collection of surcharges by hospitals
from patients, except those patients covered by Blue Cross and Blue
Shield. The Court found that preemption would be inconsistent with what
Congress intended the federal role to be and that the consequence of
preemption would be to dismantle a state regulatory function that had
been in place since well before ERISA. This change in the structure of
the argument is very much like the change from Smith to Bailey, but is
even more overt.
In 1995, the Supreme Court also decided Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon," the "spotted owl" case.
There the Supreme Court was confronted with a regulation the
Department of the Interior had issued pursuant to its authority under the
Endangered Species Act. The Endangered Species Act makes it illegal
168. 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
169. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 115 S. Ct. at 1677. Section 514 of the statute says
that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they ... relate to any
employee benefit plan" covered by ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
170. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); District' of Columbia v. Greater
Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992). But see Fisk, supra note 112, at 58-90
(criticizing these decisions and other decisions).
171. Greater Washington, 506 U.S. at 129.
172. 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
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for anyone to "take" an endangered species."" "Take," in turn, is
defined in the statute to mean, "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such
conduct."' 74 The regulation at issue in Sweet Home defined "harm" in
the statutory definition to mean, "an act which actually kills or injures
wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly
impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or
sheltering."175
The question raised in this case was whether the word "take" in the
statute-which includes "harm" through the definitional section-could
support the regulation, which prohibits modification of the habitat of an
endangered species. The issue was an important one for both
environmentalists and loggers. If the regulation were found to be
unauthorized by the statute, then loggers, who are largely small business
people, would be permitted to cut down trees that provided the only
habitat for the northern spotted owl and another species of bird.
Upholding the regulation would have serious negative effects on the
logging industry and on many people living in the relevant area. Thus,
like Smith and Bailey, Sweet Home was about the goodness of fit between
events and statutory language. Under the Chevron doctrine, ambiguities
are resolved in favor of the interpretation advanced by the agency
promulgating the regulation.'76 Thus, it was up to the loggers to
demonstrate that the statutory language could not possibly justify the
regulation.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Stevens, upheld
the regulation. Of course, it looked up "harm" in the dictionary. But
most of the opinion was devoted to discussing the policies underlying the
Endangered Species Act. The Court focused on legislative history and
earlier precedents in which first Congress, and later the Supreme Court,
had determined that the Act sets the preservation of nature's diversity as
a national priority, even when it causes substantial inconvenience. The
Court referred heavily to TVA v. Hill,'" for analysis of the legislative
history of the Endangered Species Act. Despite its close linguistic
analysis of the statute, which was lacking in Hill, the Court's
argumentation in Sweet Home far more closely resembles its earlier
173. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (a)(1) (1994).
174. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994).
175. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994).
176. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
177. 437 U.S. 153 (1978); see also discussion supra part IV.
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Endangered Species Act decision in Hill than it does the more
contemporary Reves case.
Justice Scalia dissented. Most of his points were textual. He
argued, using the dictionary for support, that cutting down the trees in
which the owls live would not "harm" any individual owl. It would
merely prevent the birds from breeding, and would lead to their extinction
through attrition. He called this "psychic injury," well outside the
ordinary (i.e., prototypical) meaning of "harm." He further noted that
all of the other proscribed actions in the statute, besides harm, required
some sort of active injury to the endangered animals. "Harm," he
argued, should be interpreted similarly.
Given the standard of review, that ambiguities are resolved in favor
of the Department of the Interior, Scalia's textual arguments are probably
not sufficient to carry the day. On purely linguistic grounds, however,
he had the better of the argument.
But this case was not really about the text of the statute. It was
about national policy concerning wildlife preservation. And Scalia knew
this as well. His most telling argument comes right at the beginning of
his dissent:
I think it is unmistakably clear that the legislation at issue here
(1) forbade the hunting and killing of endangered animals, and
(2) provided federal lands and federal funds for the acquisition
ofprivate lands, to preserve the habitat of endangered animals.
The Court's holding that the hunting and killing prohibition
incidentally preserves habitat on private lands imposes
unfairness to the point of financial ruin-not just upon the rich,
but upon the simplest farmer who finds his land conscripted to
national zoological use.178
That is the issue: whether the regulation, which may be a stretch under
the statutory language, but by no means an impossible interpretation,
should prevail at the expense of the local economy. And that is
something worth fighting about.
178. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2421.
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CONCLUSION
Courts have no choice but to start speaking where statutes stop.'79
Reluctant to admit that they are exercising state power in using their
discretion, American courts during the past decade have all too often
taken to pretending that this is not so, blaming instead the various
publishers of dictionaries and the like for the results they reach.
Academic writers have almost uniformly suggested that interpretation
requires more than analysis of the "plain" words of the statute, since
words ordinarily are not as plain as they might at first seem, and for the
other reasons discussed earlier in this Article."8° Loyal to its textualist
bent, however, the Court has apparently taken little interest in this
barrage of criticism. In fact, the Court has abandoned its reference to
older works that suggest that statutory interpretation requires analysis of
the statute's purpose. For example, a LEXIS search shows that the Court
has simply stopped referring to Hart and Sacks' The Legal Process,'81
even though the Court had for many years referred to this work
periodically," and even though the work is still very much alive in the
academic community, perhaps more so than ever.'83
179. This point has been recognized in the literature dealing with the plain
language approach to statutes. For an insightful and candid account by a sitting judge,
see Stewart G. Pollock, The Art of Judging, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 591 (1996); see also
Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule
of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533 (1992); Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of
the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989).
180. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 111; DWORKIN, supra note 37; POSNER,
supra note 21; Aleinikoff & Shaw, supra note 45; Eskridge, supra note 3; Popkin, supra
note 90.
181. HENRY HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (Tentative ed. 1958).
182. The Court's only reference to Hart and Sacks from 1984 through the present
is in the separate opinion of Justice Stevens in Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 961-62
(1994). The Court had referred to the work nine times in the preceding thirteen-year
period, and has referred to it thirteen times in total.
183. A second LEXIS search shows that Hart and Sacks has been cited in law
reviews 450 times from 1984 through August 18, 1996, albeit critically in many instances.
Moreover, in 1994, the work was finally published, increasing its access. HENRY HART,
JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MEANING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW (William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey eds. 1994). While Hart
and Sacks may not have the prestige it once had, it is clearly of continuing interest to
legal scholars. For discussion of the reduced influence of The Legal Process, see HART
& SACKS, supra, at cxviii (Eskridge and Frickey's introduction). See also William S.
Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO
L. REV. 799, 837 (1985); Anthony J. Sebok, Reading The Legal Process, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 1571, 1594 (1996).
Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases
I see in Bailey, Blue Cross & Blue Shield and Sweet Home a trend
away from the Court's linguistic enslavement, which I regard as positive.
While it is too early to tell how substantial a trend it is, these cases are
by no means isolated examples. Justice Stevens continues to take the lead
in this attack.' But as Bailey and Blue Cross & Blue Shield illustrate,
Stevens is not alone. 1'
Significantly, these cases maintain the close examination of statutory
language, including examination of surrounding sections of the statute,
that Justice Scalia's textualism has made a routine part of statutory
interpretation. Thus, they preserve the serious respect for Congress'
words upon which Scalia has insisted. They also reflect a healthy caution
about reference to legislative history. Their innovation is in the absence
of absolute methodological constraints that cut off the analysis too early.
The parlor game seems to be coming to a close.
To the extent that the Court's most recent explorations forthrightly
recognize the difficulty we have in formulating rules of general
application, they enhance the chances of creating a more thoughtful
jurisprudence. This will be the case even when the Court feels obliged
to maintain its display of heightened respect for linguistic argumentation.
It worked in Bailey, just as it had in Locke ten years earlier. But often
enough, it will force us to admit that the best we can expect from a rule
in hard cases is focused disagreement about its application. This is a
lesson worth accepting, since it follows from aspects of our cognitive
organization that we can deny only at the cost of pretending that our laws
work better than they ever can.
184. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328,
345 n.7 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting); P.U.D. No.1 v. Washington Dep't of Ecology,
511 U.S. 700, 723 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129,
146 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting); District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of
Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 138 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
185. See United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1489 (1996) (Breyer, J.
concurring) (using legislative history to construe Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure in a selective prosecution case); Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank and Trust
Co., 116 S. Ct. 637, 642 (1996) (opinion of Ginsburg, J.) (scrutinizing drafting history
of Expedited Funds Availability Act to determine if Congress intended agency both to
regulate and to adjudicate disputes); United States v. Noland, 116 S. Ct. 1524, 1526-27,
1528 (1996) (opinion of Souter, J., for a unanimous Court) (using statements by members
of Congress prior to enactment to construe the Bankruptcy Code, but rejecting statements
by same individuals as authority on status of prior law); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc.,
115 S. Ct. 1061, 1071-73 (1995) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (analyzing House and Senate
reports to determine intended definition of "prospectus" in Securities Act of 1933).
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